The Politics of Liberalisation: Guzman, p. 105) Does politics determine learning or does learning determine politics? Some influential interpretations of the liberalisation of world economies seem to suggest, although rarely explicitly, that learning is the driving force behind the 'great transformation' to a more liberal world. We know better now, so the argument goes, and therefore replace the old public monopolies with new, efficient and profit-hungry corporations that can adapt better to the complex economic interactions and rapid technological changes of today. This newly-acquired knowledge and the harmonious working of markets and technologies are reflected in the irresistible diffusion of liberalisation across countries and sectors. This plausible argument -often advanced by economists -represents a theoretical challenge to political analysts since learning is often described and perceived as an apolitical process (cf. Hemerijck and van Kersbergen, 1999) .
Privatisation and Regulation-for-Competition in Europe's and Latin America's Telecoms and Electricity Industries
Some efforts to deal with this theoretical challenge were made in the literature in the last years. This is reflected via the popularisation of notions such as lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991) , isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) , growth of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) , policy harmonisation (Majone, 1991) , policy emulation (Bennett, 1991) and policy learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988) , as well as the effort to model types of policy learning (Dolowitz and March, 2000) . All these notions testify to the growing awareness in the profession of the importance of the politics of learning in making change desirable and possible. 1 In order to deal with the theoretical challenge of the 'learning-determine-politics' approach this paper demonstrates how politics and learning interact in the diffusion of liberalisation across
Europe and Latin America in the telecommunications and electricity sectors. In doing so, the paper also demonstrates how collective learning is a political process and how it mediates the process of learning. The analysis is grounded in the theoretical framework of actor-centred historical institutionalism. Thus cross-national and crosssectoral commonalties and variations are analysed as a product of cost-benefit calculations of actors constrained by the sectors they confront as well as by their institutional context -most significantly the power of the state and the relationship between state and society (Levi, 1988; Geddes, 1994; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Scharpf, 1997) . This theoretical framework is employed to account for the slower pace of liberalisation in electricity as compared to that of telecoms as well as to explain how Latin American liberalisation differs inherently from the European despite apparent similarities between the two regions). It thus allows us to unfold the Latin American saga of continuity amid the struggle to create institutional structures strong enough to promote economic development and of the foiled effort to become European in more than a superficial sense.
Two important aspects of the process of liberalisation in the telecoms and electricity sectors are examined: Privatisation of ownership and the creation of regulatory structures for the promotion of competition, including the establishment of the so- ). The study of privatisation and IRAs promises not only to capture two of the most important aspects of liberalisation but also to furnish us with two complementary viewpoints on its patterns of diffusion. While it might be argued that privatisation is intimately connected with the retreat (selling, shrinking) of the state, the creation of IRAs might well serve as an indicator of restructure, whichparadoxically -reinforces state control over the economy (Levi-Faur, 1998 ). This paper demonstrates how variations in state--society relations and especially in the strength and autonomy of the state, are responsible for subtle, but crucial, trajectories of liberalisation in Latin America and Europe across different sectors.
Insert Graphs 1& 2 about here
The two sectors studied here -telecoms and electricity -were closely intertwined with the nation-state as we have come to know it since the late nineteenth century.
The rise of big business, the welfare state, the mixed economy, and the affluent society of the post-war era are all mirrored in the development dynamics of these industries and especially in the acceleration of rural and urban electrification;
impelling the process of telephonication; nationalisation; nurturing national equipment industries; and constructing nationally-bounded electricity and telephony networks. Since the early 1980s, however, remarkable changes are clearly evident.
Notable in the telecoms field are the divestiture of AT&T (1984) as well as the privatisation of British Telecom (1984) and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (1985) (Newbery, 1999) . 3 In the 1990s privatisation and the establishment of Separate Regulatory Agencies (SRAs) became widespread across countries and sectors. Graph Similarly to the changes in telecoms though less markedly, indications of change are evident in the electricity industry. The first indication of systematic change was probably that of former US President Jimmy Carter in his Public Utilities Regulatory
Policies Act (1978) . This act opened electricity generation to independent power producers. Remarkable were the divestiture and privatisation programs of Chile (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) and even more so the divestiture and privatisation of the British electricity industry (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) . While indications of change seemed sporadic in the 1980s, by the mid-1990s, it became clear that the world electricity industry was facing a tremendous transformation (Gilbert and Kahn, 1996; Pollitt, 1997) . Indeed, a significant development was the EU's electricity directive of 1996 (Schmidt, 1997) .
In electricity as in telecoms privatisation and the establishment of SRAs became widespread. Graph 2 presents the advance of SRAs in the electricity industry. In 57 out of 130 countries where data was available SRAs now regulate the sector. 1980s, the establishment of SRAs around the world became normal practice in the mid-1990s. The pace is so rapid and its spread so comprehensive that it is reasonably safe to predict that most countries are bound to privatise and establish SRAs for these industries in the near future.
The paper explains both commonalties and variations across nations and sectors and in doing so reconciles the Policy Sector Approach (PSA) and the National Patterns Approach (NPA) (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck, 1994; Waarden, 1995) . These approaches call for different levels of analysis and consequently offer different predictions on the mechanisms that carry and propel the spread of liberalisation. The analytical framework recognises the importance of both in a way that allows it to explore the conditions under which each provides a more persuasive explanation. Specifically, four combinations of variations and similarities across sectors and nations are here identified and explained. First, similarities across nations and sectors are explained as the outcome of the cost-benefit calculations of public officials' perceiving liberalisation in terms of policy learning.
Jumping on the liberalisation bandwagon reflects their 'desire' to learn but also political calculations of risk-and-cost of lagging behind. This explanation sheds some light on the political aspects of learning which undermine the strong apolitical reasoning seemingly behind (some explanations of) the process of diffusion of liberalisation. Second, variations in public actors' strategies in two different institutional settings -strong states versus weak states -explain cross-national variations that serve as evidence of the NPA. Specifically, it is argued that strong states tend to learn more than to emulate, to embrace voluntary transfers rather than coercive ones, and to adopt complex rather than simple types of policies. Third, crosssectoral variations supporting the PSA are explained as the outcome of the different risks-and-rewards that the two sectors represent for public officials. Higher risks in electricity and greater political and economic rewards in telecoms explain the greater propensity of public officials to liberalise telecoms. Finally, variations across both nations and sectors are identified. Specifically, that the PSA is supported mostly by the European cases, while the NPA is supported by Latin American cases. This pattern is the outcome of the differences in the demand and supply of social support between Europe and Latin America.
I. Analytical Framework
As of the late 1980 and increasingly since the mid-1990s, privatisation and IRAs gained ground and have become widespread in electricity and telecoms.
5
Liberalisation started in the 1980s with an emphasis on 'privatisation', but in the 1990s attention seemed to shift to regulatory reforms, in particular to the promotion of competition in the infrastructure of capitalist economies (Newbery, 1999) . One of the indications for these developments is reflected in the literature on the rise of the regulatory state appearing since the late 1980s (e.g., Veljanovski, 1987; Majone, 1990; Moran, 2001; Muller, 2002) . While privatisation policies are centred on the form of ownership and specifically on the transfer of ownership from public to private domain, regulatory reforms are centred on the creation of institutional and regulatory rules and incentives for the promotion of competition. This entails rules for each segment of the network fashioned according to its perceived potential for competition on the one hand and the balance of power between actors and institutions on the other (Levi-Faur, 1999) . This design of competition rules requires legal and administrative capacities and extensive technological and economic experience and knowledge.
Thus, if privatisation signifies a retreat of the state, regulation-of-competition represents the return of the state. Together they reveal the Janus head of liberalisation and the paradox of "Freer Markets, More Rules" (Vogel, 1996) . Liberalisation appeared on the public agenda as an ideology of economic freedom and political liberty. Yet normative arguments were always supported by a variety of efficiency-driven arguments such as the perceived failure, or at best mediocrity, of government enterprises as compared to private entrepreneurship. The problems of principal-agent relations, capture, accountability, and managerial autonomy vs.
political interference and motivation that are often associated with public ownership were often used to justify privatisation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Hodge, 2000) . A measure of the success of this double-edged advocacy of privatisation is found in notions of 'paradigm change' (Hall, 1989) and 'hegemony breakdown' (Kalyvas, 1994) IRAs are designed as small, professional units and are -due to financial independence and transparent design -less prone to capture (Cukierman, 1992; Levy and Spiller, 1996; Doren and Wilks, 1998 one is interested to establish the case for the opposite approach.
Insert Table 1 about Here In order to capture and then explain the complex picture of the spread of liberalisation and the interaction between learning and politics, we have employed a fourfold distinction between possible outcomes of the spread of liberalisation (see Table 1 ).
The Policy Sector Approach (PSA) suggests that the sectors are bound to exhibit similar patterns across countries. Thus policy-making is likely to converge across sectors in different countries (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck, 1994) . The National Patterns Approach (NPA), by contrast, predicts that the major variations will be among nations, not across sectors (Richardson, 1982; Vogel, 1986) . These conflicting predictions on the extent of similarities and variations across nations and sectors are summarised in 
II. Research Design
Most studies of regulatory reforms and especially the study of the liberalisation of the world's infrastructure are grounded often in one or more of the following three research strategies. First, on small-N analysis, that is, including one to four cases.
Second, on sector-specific study, that is, on the study of one specific sector often in one to four countries (e.g, telecoms in Britain and France). Third, on Most Similar System Design, that is, on the selection of cases so as to minimise the effect of political and economic variations. In Most Similar System Design the logic of comparison is based on the assumption that the more similar the cases being compared, the simpler it should be to isolate the intervening factors (Przeworski and Teune, 1970 ). An alternative approach -usually associated with statistical analysisis to select the case on the principle of a Most Different System Design. Here the logic is to compare as different cases as possible, demonstrating the robustness of a relationship between dependent and independent variables. Such a design assumes that the argument of the research is better supported by demonstrating that the observed relationship holds despite the wide range of contrasting settings (Ibid.). This paper extends the research in the fields of comparative public policy and comparative political economy in that it offers a research design that may best be characterised as Medium-N analysis employing both Most-Similar and Most-Different designs, combining analyses at both the sectoral and the national levels.
While it is frequently recognised that liberalisation and regulatory reforms are sectors is confronted with the most similar cases of telecoms and electricity networks (Levi-Faur, 2000) and thus with the most challenging cases for its predictions. All in all, this somewhat unconventional research design can be interpreted as an effort to develop a methodology that will combine the strength of case-oriented analysis with quantitative approach. Two major studies by Eric Nordlinger, The Autonomy of the Democratic State (1981) and Taking the State Seriously (1987), serve to conceptualise the strength of the state.
Following Nordlinger, we hold the state to be 'all the individuals who occupy offices that authorise them and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society' (Nordlinger, 1981: 11 ). Nordlinger's distinction between types of states is followed although only two of his extreme types are used here. The strength of the state is determined by how it ranks on two variables: autonomy and societal support. Strong states are those that enjoy high autonomy and support while weak states rank low both on autonomy and support (Nordlinger, 1987: 369) . The state is autonomous according to Nordlinger 'to the extent that it translates its own preferences into authoritative actions. A totally autonomous state, if there is such an entity, invariably acts as it chooses to act, and does not act when it prefers not to do so….' (Nordlinger,1987: 362) .
The strength of the state is operationalized as a dichotomous variable that takes the values 'weak' or 'strong'. It is assumed to be low for all Latin American cases and high for all European cases. This somewhat arbitrary classification is based on two foundations. First, it is based on extensive and largely uncontested qualitative literature on warfare and state building. The unique experience of warfare in Europe is suggested as the causal mechanism that has contributed to the creation of strong states in this region. As was argued by Tilly "war made the state and the state made war" (Tilly, 1975: 42) . Stein Rokkan wrote that: 'the European sequence simply cannot be repeated in the newest nations' (Rokkan,1975: 600) . It is therefore not surprising to find agreement in the discipline well beyond theoretical divisions that Latin American states are weak or dependent (Huntington, 1968: 1-2; Anglade and Fortin, 1985: 287; Migdal, 1988; Whitehead, 1994; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Fishlow, 1990 ). The weakness is to some extent the product of comparatively low levels of warfare during was carried out by the World Bank's study group on governance Zoido-Lobaton, 1999a, 1999b) . They constructed a new governance database containing over 300 governance measures compiled from a variety of surveys, which were then aggregated to higher-level indicators. One of these indicators is the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies. for the raw data). The data is sliced according to various criteria. The first three columns present the data for all 32 countries studied. Column 1 aggregates the data for both the telecoms and electricity sectors; column 2 does so for telecoms and column 3 for electricity. The next three columns present the Latin American data while the final three present the data for Europe. Together they provide us with the opportunity to examine patterns of similarities and variations across countries and sectors.
III. Let the Data Speak: Variations and Similarities across Sectors and Nations

Insert table 2 about here
Let us start with evidence of cross-national and cross-sectoral similarities (as summarised in column 1 of Table 2 ). First, it reveals the remarkable spread of the privatisation of incumbents in the electricity and telecoms sectors. In 44 out of 63 possible cases we found some form of privatisation. 11 Second, the creation of separate regulatory agencies is another sweeping phenomenon. In 56 out of 64 possible cases, governments moved toward the establishment of separate regulators for the telecoms and the electricity industries. Third, similarities are evident for both sectors in both the median year for privatisation and the year of creation of SRAs (1995 or 1996 for both indicators). The fact that the median year is very similar is highly suggestive of the interdependence of privatisation across sectors and of the relations between privatisation and the creation of separate regulatory agencies. A fourth indication of similarities is the impressive number of agencies that are nominally autonomous from the government (38 IRAs). These cross-national and cross-sectoral similarities imply a process of change that seems to be driven by extra-sectoral and extra-national forces. It is therefore reasonable to assume that most of the remaining public telecoms and electricity incumbents are bound to be privatised in the coming decade.
A review of columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 reveals that four cross-sectoral variations support the PSA. First, the propensity of the telecoms sector to privatisation is found to be greater than that of electricity. Second, differences in the structure of ownership of the two sectors are still unmistakable. In 2000 telecoms and electricity showed corresponding scores of 3.4 and 2.8 implying that telecoms that was before the upsurge of liberalisation was markedly more 'public' than electricity is nowadays more 'private' than electricity. Not only do states tend to sell less of their electricity industries, but even when they do they tend to be more cautious in the measure of transfer of ownership. Third, there are significant variations in the number of SRAs across the sectors: 32 in telecoms but only 25 in electricity. Finally, there are significant variations in the extent of independence granted to the SRAs in these sectors (21 IRAs in telecoms versus 16 in electricity).
Comparison of the data in columns 4 and 7 ( Latin America, the subsequent part of the paper analyses indicators of how countries liberalised rather than on whether they did so. The second indicator measures the difference in the timing of privatisation between telecoms and electricity. This indicator assumes that voluntarism in policy transfer is reflected in longer time spans in the decision to privatise the two sectors.
IV. In Search of National Variations
Simultaneous privatisation of both sectors reflects external pressure -financial or political -to sell immediately and without the benefit of experimentalism. 
VTI=
V. Actors, Institutions and Policy Transfers: Games Real Actors Play
This section offers explanations for the patterns of similarities and variations across the countries and the sectors studied. The analysis tackles the four different situations that we defined from the political and economic viewpoint of state officials who are at the intersection between the domestic and the international domains. The relevant external environment includes institutions such as the World Bank and the European
Commission as well as all-powerful and affluent governments such as the United
States (with direct and indirect control over huge financial resources) and Britain (often the best-practice model but even more often the reference point for selfevaluation by non-Britons). The domestic environment includes the electorate, epistemic communities and special interest groups, particularly business and labour.
When liberalisation appears as a policy option on their agenda, state officials undertake cost-benefit analyses. In a strife to balance policy success and political survival, liberalisation is considered not only on its merits but also as an instrument of political survival.
Explaining General Patterns
Why similarities across both sectors and nations? The rapid advance of liberalisation across sectors and nations alludes to some strong incentives to liberalise and possibly to some constraints on retaining the status quo as well. Actor-centred analysis may suggest that liberalisation is a special case wherein conflicts between politicians' survival and success games were minimal. One may go even farther and say that these goals were interdependent, as the first could not be achieved without the second. Five major factors are responsible for the higher political risks associated with electricity liberalisation. First, the gradual approach that allowed consensus-building in telecoms could be only partly applied to electricity. The liberalisation of telecoms first emerged in relatively small segments of the market and it took 15 year till it had extended to the local loop (that is, to the retail competition in the supply of local telephone services). This gradual process was only partly possible in electricity and thus consensus-building in this sector is more costly. The promotion of competitive markets in all segments of the electricity sectors had to be introduced simultaneously since they were closely interdependent. 16 Second, experimentation with competition was only barely possible in electricity. Whereas it was possible to introduce competition to segments of the markets in telecoms (equipment, international and long-distance calls, mobile) and thus to experiment with competitive markets, the possibility of doing so in electricity was limited. Telecoms liberalisation was no doubt less risky than that of electricity.
A third reason for the higher risks of the liberalisation of electricity are the considerable costs involved in terms of levelling the field for new and old players. implying, for some states, a considerable increase in the extent of their energy dependency. Given the status of electricity as an essential service, national sensitivities over the control of the system, although gradually declining, are still strong enough to render reorganisation of the sector far more risky than the case with telecoms. Finally, system reliability is more critical in electricity as system failure may in the extreme cases involve loss of life and social and economic chaos.
Although liberalisation does not necessarily lead to failure, it involves some problems of control during the transition periods that make it risky for state officials. All these reasons combined to render competition and the lessening of central control in electricity much more complex than with telecoms. The failure of the competitive regime in the electricity market in California had no equivalent in telecoms and may prove strong support for these assertions. (Pool, 1983) . The contemporary popular notions of 'information society' and 'information economy' are not natural representations of future social and economic trends. They are among the 'politics of symbols' which have shaped our perceptions of the good and the bad, the possible and the inevitable.
If electricity technology is identified in our minds with large, polluting, mysterious, and dangerous generation technologies, telecoms technologies are identified with the digital telephone, the fax, the modem, and more recently the Internet: all common household gadgets. The opening of new venues in telecoms has become popular with the elites and the wider public alike, whereas such support is lacking in electricity. To the extent that state officials are vote-and legitimacy-maximizers, they have greater incentives to associate themselves with telecoms liberalisation than with that of electricity.
Explaining Cross National Variations
Support for the NPA is manifested in the greater propensity of Europe than of Latin America to create SRAs and IRAs as well as to learning and to voluntary and complex transfers. In order to explain these variations consider the variations in the cost-benefit considerations of public officials in weak vs. strong states.
Public officials may initiate a process of learning or settle on emulation. Emulation has several advantages: it is less resource-demanding than learning, quicker in terms of results, more certain with regard to outputs, less dependent on external resources, and can freely concentrate on the aspects that acquire most support from mass media and international audiences. In view of the high costs of learning, the relative scarcity of professional input as well as the greater uncertainty of success, it is reasonable to suggest that public officials in a weak state will be more likely to emulate than their counterparts in a strong state. The LTI supplies some support for this proposition as it points to variations in the scores of Latin America (60) and Europe (78). The index reflects the assertion that privatisation is much more attractive to prospective emulators than is the establishment of IRAs. The reason is simple: emulators make a political rather than a policy statement. Privatisation is a more assertive statement about a country's image and orientation than the creation of IRAs. The stronger propensity of privatisation for emulation does not mean that it is not a rational policy step but that it promises much higher rewards for emulators than the less glamorous job of designing IRAs.
The stronger propensity of public officials in strong states to delegate might be perceived by reference to the different levels of social support in weak and strong states. While the strength of the state increases with the social support it receives, social support also introduces checks to the arbitrary use of power. When officials'
power is checked it is easier for them to grant more independence to regulatory authorities. Unlike the situation in strong states, power in weak states -to the degree that it is in the hands of public officials -is not constrained by societal pressure. As public officials' authority in weak states is more vulnerable, they are less likely to relinquish authority by delegating it to IRAs. 19 This may also be the outcome of the stronger constraints on constructive action by politicians who aim to enhance state capacities. In a remarkable study on state capacities in Latin America, Geddes describes these constraints as the 'politician's dilemma', that is, the wrenching conflict between the politician's need for immediate political survival and longer-run collective interests in improving state capacities (Geddes, 1994: 18) . While this dilemma is not unique to weak states, its effects in such states are much more troublesome. One direct implication is that by delegating power to independent regulatory authorities the politician deprives himself of a potential source of patronage and thus weakens his survival prospects. Thus, weaker social constraints on the extent of arbitrary use of power and stronger effects of patronage explain the greater propensity to emulation of transfers in weak states.
Public officials in strong and weak states differ in their vulnerability to coercive transfers and in their propensity to voluntary transfers. Weak states are prone to coercive transfers. The absolute levels of coercion and voluntarism are less significant than the variations across different states. While it may be reasonable to argue that transfers in both regions were voluntary (or coercive), it is quite clear that the context of reform in Latin America was less voluntary. The evidence for crisis-ridden decision-making is ample as is also of the pressure from international organisations, financial creditors and the United States. It is also clear that the levels of electrification and telephonication were lower in Latin America and thus represented a greater burden for public officials. As a final point, the Latin American utilities were more debt-ridden than the European and could hardly rely on subsidies from their national budget. Indeed, financial constraints had their effects in Europe, particularly for some of the countries opting to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). In these cases, the privatisation of public utilities was a mechanism that aided countries with budget deficits, like Italy, to qualify for membership of the EMU. Yet the scale of pressure in Europe was much lower than in Latin America. The VTI index captures some of the variations in the extent of coercion in the two regions as it summarises scores for the extent of partial privatisation and the differences in the timing of privatisation in the two sectors. Unlike Europe, the style of privatisation in Latin America was characterised by complete 'wholesale' privatisation, that is, the selling of a majority of, or more often all, the shares of the privatised company. The move was more gradual in Europe, in some cases merely selling a minority of shares, to that of selling a majority of shares in a time-span of around five years. In many cases, privatisation did not proceed beyond the threshold of a 50% + 1 share that were kept by the state. In other cases in Europe, golden shares were devised (especially in early privatisations) to ensure the protection of essential national and social interests not only by law and by the regulatory regime but also by preferential ownership rights.
The time gaps between the privatisation of the two sectors were wider in Europe than in Latin America and again reflects the gradualism and discretion highly associated with voluntarism. It is thus rather unsurprising that Europe's score in the VTI index is higher than Latin America's. The interaction between learning and politics in the diffusion of liberalisation was studied by combining insights and levels of analysis of the Policy Sector Approach (PSA) with that of the National Patterns Approach (NPA). The analytical framework presented in Table 1 1934 1976 1979 1984 1990 1992 1994 1996 1999 2001 1935 1985 1987 1989 1992 1994 1996 1999 2001 Cumulative Number of Separate Regulators Telecoms: Printed material for the telecom cases include:, Books by Noam (1992;  1998), Petrazzini (1995) , Molano (1997) and Manzetti (1999) and paper by Wellenius (2000) . In addition, interviews and e-mail exchanges with regulatory authorities and ministries were used such as EU regulatory developments (http://www.ispo.cec.be), the ITU regulatory database (http://www.itu.int/ITU-D-TREG/), the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/subject/regreform/ sectoral/telecommunications.htm) and World Bank Papers on Regulatory Reforms (http://econ.worldbank.org/topic.php?topic=14).
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